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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to explore how the connection between
political ideology and voters’ preferences is able to generate different
equilibria in a yardstick competition game, where good incumbents are
forced to create a bad reputation or, in other words, to mimic the bad
incumbents’ behavior in order to win the elections in a two-candidate
political competition.
1DEFAP - Universita’ Cattolica del Sacro Cuore - Milan; e-mail address:
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1 Introduction
The literature about the yardstick competition is becoming one of the main
topic of research in the political economy, since the seminal paper by Besley
& Case ([6]). The typical assumption which characterizes a yardstick com-
petition game is that voters are assumed to make comparisons between ju-
risdictions to overcome political agency problems, even though they are not
able neither to distinguish bad incumbents (rent-seekers) from good incum-
bents (welfaristic) nor to evaluate the real state of economy. The voters’
abilty to observe tax-setting in different jurisdictions generates two effects:
a selection effects, which separates good governments from bad governments
and a discipline effect, which forces bad governments to act as if they were
good. In the presence of a political competition, where elections take place,
bad incumbents realize that if voters are able to compare domestic level of
taxation with level of taxation of other jurisdictions, they have less possi-
bility to distort resources from society’s welfare. Indeed, they are forced to
build a good reputation, adopting good incumbent’s policies in order to be re-
elected. Nevertheless, there is no a common agreement among researchers
about the ability of the yardstick competition to reach both the effects.
Furthermore, Besley & Smart ([3]) remind as economists who believe that
government is benevolent are prone to see inter-governmental competition
as a source of negative externalities which lower welfare, whilst the public
choice perspective which assumes the existence of Leviathan governments
sees yardstick competition as potentially beneficial for welfare. The authors
underline the importance of information advantages of yardstick competi-
tion since, in equilibrium, voters are more likely to retain good domestic
incumbents, once they see that governments in other jurisdictions extract
rents; secondly, the initial reputation of a government is fundamental to
determine the existence of pooling equilibria; a low reputation of the for-
eign incumbent reduces the probability that voters re-elect a bad incumbent.
Bordignon et al. ([7]) underline the role of degrees of correlation between
economies and the importance of initial reputation of incumbents which may
lead toward more pooling or separating equilibria. Nevertheless, the clas-
sical approach to the yardstick competition let some questions open. First
of all, the assumption that voters perfectly know the other jurisdictions’
policy is a strong one. Hardly one may imagine that a typical citizen is
aknowledged about tax rates, incomes and expenses of all the other local
governments; still, when a citizen has to evaluate an incumbent may link
taxes with the usage the incumbent has made of tax revenues (i.e. building
new parkings, parks, metro lines and so forth); from this point of view, if
a citizen evaluate that the incumbent has made a good usage of taxes col-
lected with respect to other local jurisdictions, it would be prone to accept
an higher level of taxation. Even supposing that citizens would be perfectly
informed about all the other jurisdictions’ economic performance and they
2
would exclusively vote according to the relative level of taxation they still
would not know which policy would be suitable for the local economy. If
we assume that economic performances are a private information of candi-
dates, that means that also the degree of correlation between economies is
a private information of candidates. As a consequence, if a voter does not
know what his local economy needs, he does not what another local needs,
either. At this point, who may convince him that the bording jurisdiction
needs a lower (higher) taxation than his jurisdictions? Suppose two juris-
diction A and B, whose economies are perfectly correlated and affected by
a negative shock, which entails the need for a raise in taxation. Suppose
also that they only differ because in jurisdiction A there is a bad incumbent
who is willing to win elections. Finally, suppose that the good incumbent in
jurisdiction B acts as the good type and raises taxes as the economy needs,
but that jurisdiction A’s bad incumbent accuses the former to be bad and
raising taxes only for private interests, assuring the electorate that the state
of economy is good. If voters are neither able to evaluate the state of the
economy nor the degree of correlation between jurisdictions which candidate
do they believe is good? In this case, there would be more than an incentive
for the candidate to play populist strategy in order to attract voters and
playing his favourite strategy during the second term. At this point, the
good government find itself in a critical situation because if voters believe
in bad candidate, he runs into risk to be taken as a bad type and not to be
re-elected. Thus, it is rational to think that, in this case, he could mimic
the bad incumbent in playing a populistic strategy as to win elections in
the first term and, at least in the second term, playing a welfarist policy.
In a nut-shell the good government is creating a bad reputation, since he
is acting as if he was a bad candidate. This papers analysis just this sit-
uation. I argue that, expecially when the economy is affected by negative
shocks, pooling equilibria where good governments mimic bad governments
arise. This result may be considered as negative, since it weakens the previ-
ous results in literature, which affirmed that the yardstick competition acts
both as a selection and a discipline device. According to my results, bad
reputation pooling equilibria reduce the role of yardstick competition to act
as a discipline device; otherwise, yardstick competition may become even
harmful when voters simply compare economic results among jurisdictions
without knowing what single economies really need.
2 The model
2.1 Candidates
I consider a two-period model with three political candidates D,R and W,
where D stands for Democratic, R for Republican and W for Welfaristic.
On each party I attached a political label, which I assume is exogenously
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taken at the beginning of the electoral campaign. For instance, we may
think about the most familiar labeling system in the U.S., where candidates
are located in a left-right or liberal-conservative scale. In my model I as-
sume that candidate R is labeled as “conservative”and that it is supported
by voters who get higher utility from labor taxation, rather than capital.
Otherwise, candidate D is labeled as “liberal”and it is supported by voters
who get higher utility from capital taxation, rather than labor. Thus, the
space of candidates is given by ΘC = {D,R,W}. Furthermore, candidate
D may be a good or a bad type and so may be candidate R. Thus, the space
of type is ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb
}
. Each candidate may play only four
policies: two populistic policies (the right-wing policy aR and the left-wing
policy aD), which provide more welfare to oriented voters, a welfaristic pol-
icy aW , which is neutral and a bad policy abp which enables the government
to subtract rents to the society’s welfare. Furthermore, I allow for the pos-
sibility that some shocks occur in the economy; these shocks may be seen
as all of those exogenous events which may increase (or decrease) efficiency
in the production of public goods. Shocks may be either positive (P) or
negative (N); if a shock is positive, then the efficiency in the production
increases whilst if the shock is negative the efficiency decreases. An increase
in efficiency may be seen as the possibility to produce the same amount of
good at a lower cost, or to produce an higher amount of that good at the
same cost. The cost of production is borne by tax-payers and thus, citizens
are better off when a shock is positive, since they pay less taxes. An impor-
tant assumption here is that the sign and the magnitude of the shock is a
private information of candidates, which perfectly observe whether these are
positive or negative. Otherwise, voters only perceive the existence of shocks
but are not able to measure neither the magnitude nor the sign. Thus, at
the beginning of the game, Nature chooses both the type of candidates and
the type of shock. Candidates observe Nature’s choice and then announce
(and commit) to a policy which depends on the type of shock, that is a();
voters observe candidate’s policies and vote for the candidate which have
chosen the nearest policy to their IP.
The role of ideology
I have assumed that voters attach an ideological label to each candidate,
which denotes its position on a predictive scale. As a consequence, the ide-
ology directly enters into the candidates’ utility function. I suppose that if
a candidate chooses a policy which stands over the bisector τL = τK + 1 it
gets an utility deriving from the ideology equal to zero. Otherwise, it gets a
positive utility equal to i if it chooses a policy which stands in the triangle
generated by the bisector and its preferred IP and a negative utility equal
to −i if the policy stands in the triangle generated by the bisector and the
other candidate’s IP. I study a case where the incumbent may be either a
good or a bad type and it faces a good challenger which may be either a
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“super-welfarist”in a sense that it is committed to play strategy aW or a
bad Government which is committed to play strategy abp. Thus, the game
can be formalized in the following structure:
ΘC = {D,R,W}
ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb
}
AI = AD =
{
aD, aR, aW , abp
}
⊆ E2
AGg = ARg =
{
aR
}
⊆ E2
AGb = ARb =
{
abp
}
⊆ E2
Pr(θR = θRg) = q
Pr(θR = θRb) = 1− q
2.2 Voters
I suppose the existence of a population of voters, portioned in three equal
groups (i.e. one voter per group): the welfarist voters, who are those who
have not any particular preference for a candidate, candidate D-oriented
voters, who support the Democratic Party and candidate R-oriented voters,
who support the Republican Party.
2.3 Equilibria of the game
2.3.1 Shock is positive
Proposition 1 If the incumbent is a good type, he chooses the populis-
tic policy aD(P ) if q ∈ [0, 2iβ(1+i)), whilst he chooses the welfaristic policy
aW (P ) if q ∈ ( 2iβ(1+i) , 1].
Proof : EU(aD(P )) = 1+ i+ 12(1+ i)βq+(1+ i)β(1− q) strictly dominates
EU(aR(P )) = 1−i+ 12(1+i)βq+(1+i)β(1−q), since i > 0. It also dominates
EU(aD(N )) = −1+i+(1+i)β(1−q) and according the transtitive property
also EU(aW (N )) = −1 + (1 + i)β(1− q) and EU(aR(N )) = −1− i+ (1 +
i)β(1− q), since −1 + i > −1 > −1− i. EU(aD(P )) > EU(aW (P )) when
q ∈ [0, 2iβ(1+i)).
This result can be interpreted as follows: if the probability to face a good
challenger is sufficiently small, the incumbent has the opportunity to play a
populistic policy which stays on his IP and favor its electorate. Otherwise,
5
if the probability to face a good challenger is high, the incumbent realizes
that playing his preferred policy would not be sufficiently safe to assure the
re-election and then he prefers to play a welfaristic policy. Notice that the
probability is a function of the ideological parameter i, suggesting that the
higher is i, the broader is the inverval to play the populistic policy and that
if the the political environment is characterized by an electorate ideologically
oriented, an equlibrium where politicians deviate from welfaristic policies is
more likely.
Proposition 2 If the incumbent is a bad type different equlibrium policy
arise, depending on the value of ideology parameter.
Proof : see Appendix B.
In the case the equilibrium strategies depend on the both the ideology pa-
rameter and the probability to challenge a good type. First of all, notice
that the bad policy is played when the probability to face a good chal-
lenger is high, meaning that when this probability is high it becomes too
costly for the bad to mimic the good type. Otherwise, when this probability
is sufficiently low, pooling equilibria arise, since the bad incumbent plays
populistic or welfaristic strategy , realizing that in doing so it has a good
probability to be re-elected and it play its preferred strategy in the second
period. Secondly, notice the importance of the role represented by the ideol-
ogy parameter and the discount factor. These two parameters entail entail
the existence of mimicking strategies (i.e. look at the the fact that the bad is
forced to play a very good policy (welfaristic policy) in intervals q3− q4 and
q4 − q3 when i ∈ [0, 2] and β ∈ (23 , 1) ora when i ∈ [2, 2β − 1] and β ∈ [0, 23).
2.3.2 Shock is negative
Proposition 3 If the incumbent is a good type, he chooses the populis-
tic policy aD(P ) if q ∈ [0, 4β(1+i)), whilst he chooses the welfaristic policy
aW (N ) if q ∈ ( 4β(1+i) , 1], if i > 2. Otherwise, if i < 2 the incumbent plays
aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 2iβ(1+i)), whilst it plays aW (N ) if q ∈ ( 2iβ(1+i) , 1].
Proof : EU(aD(N )) = 1 + i + 12(1 + i)βq + β(1 + i)(1 − q) strictly dom-
inates EU(aR(N )) = 1 − i + 12(1 + i)βq + β(1 + i)(1 − q) and thus also
EU(aW (P )) = −1+(1+i)β, EU(aR(P )) = −1−i+(1+i)β and EU(abp) =
i. EU(aD(N )) > EU(aW (N )) when q ∈ [0, 2iβ(1+i)) and EU(aD(N )) >
EU(aP (N )) when q ∈ [0, 4β(1+i)). EU(aW (N )) > EU(aD(P )) when i < 2.
This case is very interesting. Notice that we are analysing a good incumbent
facing a negative shock, so that it would be always preferible, from its and
society point of view it plays a policy function of the negative shock (i.e. we
may imagine a restrictive fiscal policy). Nevertheless, it can be seen that in
some intervals it plays a policy which is a function of the good shock. This
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happens when the probability to face a bad incumbent is high and when the
ideological parameter is high likewise. This is a bad reputation case. Indeed,
the good incumbent is forced to play a very populistic strategy and mimic
the bad type, because behaving like a good type is not attractive from a
political perspective. Even though the economy needs a tough fiscal pol-
icy, this policy is very far from voters’ IP and thus, selecting such a policy
would mean losing elections. Concluding, the good type is forced to play a
non-optimal policy, because in doing so it aims to the re-election to have a
possibility to play the optimal policy at least during the second period.
Proposition 4 If the incumbent is a bad type, he chooses the populistic
policy aD(N ) if i > 2β − 1, whilst he chooses the bad policy abp if i > 2β − 1.
Proof : EU(aD(P )) = −2 + i + β(1 + i) is greater than EU(aR(P )) =
−2 − i + β(1 + i) and than EU(aW (P )) = −2 + β(1 + i). EU(aD(N )) =
i+ 12(1+i)βq+β(1+i)(1−q) is greater than EU(aR(N )) = −i+ 12(1+i)βq+
β(1 + i)(1− q). EU(abp) = 1+ i strictly dominates EU(aW (N ) = (1 + i)β.
EU(abp) is greater than EU(aD(N )) when i < 2β , whilst EU(a
D(N )) is
greater EU(aW (N )) when i > 2β .
3 A yardstick competition case
3.1 Shock is positive
Suppose that the foreigner country government is always a good type who
is committed to play aF (P ).
Proposition 5 If the incumbent is a good type, he chooses the populistic
policy aD(P ) if q ∈ [0, 2iβ(1+i)), whilst it chooses the welfaristic strategy
aW (P ) if q ∈ ( 2iβ(1+i) , 1] and i < β2−β .
Proof : EU(aD(N )) = −1+i is greater than EU(abp) = −2+i, EU(aR(N )) =
−1−i and EU(aW (N )) = −1. EU(aD(P )) = 1+i+ 12(1+i)βq+(1+i)β(1−
q) is greater than EU(aD(N )). EU(aW (N )) is greater than EU(aD(P ))
when q ∈ ( 2iβ(1+i) , 1].
Proposition 6 If the incumbent is a bad type, it chooses the populistic pol-
icy aD(P ) if q ∈ [0, 2 − 6β(1+i)), whilst it chooses the bad strategy abp if
q ∈ (2− 6β(1+i) , 1] and i < 6β − 1.
Proof : EU(abp) = 1+ i is greater than EU(aD(N )) = i, EU(aW (N )) = 0,
EU(aR(N )) = −i, EU(aW (P )) = −2 + (1 + i)β. EU(aD(P ) = −2 + i +
1
2β(1+i)q+β(1+i)(1−q) is greater than EU(aR(P ) = −2−i+ 12β(1+i)q+
β(1+i)(1−q). EU(aD(P )) is greater than EU(abp) when q ∈ [0, 2− 6β(1+i)).
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3.2 Shock is negative
Proposition 7 If the incumbent is a good type, it chooses the populistic pol-
icy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 2iβ(1+i)), whilst it chooses the welfaristic policy aW (N )
if q ∈ ( 2iβ(1+i) , 1] if i < 2. Otherwise, when i > 2, it chooses the populistic
policy aD(P ) if q ∈ [0, 4β(1+i)), whilst it chooses the populistic policy aD(N ),
if q ∈ ( 4β(1+i) , 1].
Proof : EU(aD(N )) = 1+ i+ 12(1 + i)βq + β(1 + i)(1− q) is always greater
than EU(aR(N )) = 1 − i + 12(1 + i)βq + β(1 + i)(1 − q) and EU(abp) = i;
EU(aD(P ) = −1 + i+ β(1 + i) is always greater than EU(aR(P ) = −1−
i+β(1+ i) and EU(aW (N ) = 1+(1+ i)β strictly dominates EU(aW (P ) =
−1 + (1 + i)β. EU(aD(N )) is greater than EU(aR(N )) when q < 4β(1+i) ,
EU(aD(P )) is greater than EU(aW (N )) when i > 2 and EU(aD(N )) is
greater than EU(aW (N )) when q < 2iβ(1+i) . This is another case of bad
reputation, since again we are facing a good incumbent which is forced to
play a populistic strategy which is not optimal given the state of the shock
which affects the economy.
Proposition 8 If the incumbent is a bad type, it chooses the populistic pol-
icy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 2(1 − 1β(1+i))), whilst it chooses the bad policy abp if
q ∈ (2(1 − 1β(1+i)) , 1] if i < 3β − 1. Otherwise, when i > 3β − 1, it chooses
the populistic policy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 4β(1+i)), whilst it chooses the populistic
policy aD(P ), if q ∈ ( 4β(1+i) , 1].
Proof : EU(aD(N )) = i+ 12(1+ i)βq+β(1+ i)(1− q) is always greater than
EU(aD(N )) = −i+ 12(1+i)βq+β(1+i)(1−q); EU(aD(P )) = −2+i+β(1+i)
is always greater than EU(aB(P )) = −2− i+ β(1 + i) and EU(aW (P )) =
−2+β(1+i); EU(abp) = 1+i is always greater than EU(aW (N ) = (i+1)β.
EU(abp) is greater than EU(aD(N )) when q < 2(1 − 1β(1+i)). EU(abp) is
greater than EU(aD(P )) when i > 3β − 1. EU(aD(N )) is greater than
EU(aD(P )) when q < 4β(1+i) .
4 Conclusion
In this paper I analysed the impact of the ideology in a yardstick competition
game, using a spatial voting model approach. I demonstrated that, when
the economy is characterised by the presence of shocks, different pooling or
separating equilibria may arise. In particular, an important result refers to
the bad reputation (pooling) equilibria, where a good incumbent is forced
to mimic the bad incumbent, adopting populistic strategies which are not
optimal given the state of the economy, to win the elections. This equilibria
arise only when the shock is negative, suggesting that when the economy is
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affected by a negative environment is more difficult for the good government
to promote optimal policies, since they are more difficult to be accepted by
the electorate.
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5 Appendix A
Suppose Zi be a positive definite matrix of parameters, where every zi ∈ Zi
represents the salience that voter i attaches to an issue, x the preferred
position (or ideal point, IP) of voter i and aj the policy vector chosen by a
candidate j and kij > 0 the candidate i’s ideology evaluation of candidate j.
Then ui(aj) = kij−‖aj − xi‖ represents a quadratic metric loss function or,
in other words, the loss which a voter suffers for not to stand on his IP. Notice
that, since the funcion is additive, kij and aj are independent, meaning that
the policy chosen by a candidate do not influence the ideology of a voter.
The difference in utility between the two candidates is ui(aD) − ui(aR) =
kiD−kiR+zi[(aD−xi)2−(aR−xi)2] = kiD−kiR+2zi(aD−aR)(xi− aD+aR2 ).
If ui(aD) > ui(aR) then voter i votes for the Democratic Party, if ui(aD) <
ui(aR) he votes for the Republican Party, whilst if ui(aD) = ui(aR) he is
indifferent between the Democartic and the Republican Party. Notice that,
even though the two candidates selected the same policies (i.e. aD = aR),
the election outcome would not be a tie, since voters still would strictly
prefer the candidate he is more ideologically oriented to and the difference
kiD−kiR would be the only driver to voter’s decision. Suppose kiD = kiR for
all i = 1, ..., N . In this case voters are equally ideologically oriented toward
the two candidates and they prefer Democratic or Republican Party if and
only if aD is closer to their ID than is aR. Obviously, if the IP is equidistant
from the two policy, voters would be indifferent to the two candidates. Thus,
both candidates would selects the same policy which coincides with median
voter’s one. Suppose now that kiD 6= kiR, for some i and that ∆kij is a
random variable. I make a further assumption. Indeed, suppose to portion
the total group of voters N in two groups (N0 and Nf ); the former have an
IP equal to zero, whilst the latter have an IP equal to f . The i′th voter in
the former N0 will vote for the Democratic candidate if and only if
=yi︷ ︸︸ ︷
kiD − kiR
zi
< a2D − a2R
Suppose yj ∼ ℵ(0, σ2). Thus, the proportion of the N0 who votes for the
Democratic Party is
Pr
0
(aD, aR) =
∫
−∞
∆a2j (
1√
2piσ0
exp(− y
2
2σ20
)dy
The vote for the Democratic Party form this group is then N0 Pr0(aD, aR).
Suppose now to analyse the case of Nf voters, the i− th voter in this group
will vote for the Democratic Party if and only if
=yi︷ ︸︸ ︷
kiD − kiR
zi
< (aD − f)2 − (aR − f)2
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Again, the proportion of the Nf who votes for the Democratic Party is
Pr
f
(aD, aR) =
∫
−∞
∆(aj − f)2( 1√
2piσf
exp(− y
2
2σ2f
)dy
The vote for the Democratic Party form this group is then Nf Prf (aD, aR).
Thus, the total vote for the Democratic Party is V (aD, aR) = N0 Pr0(aD, aR)+
Nf Prf (aD, aR). Likewise, the total vote for the Republican Party is 1 −
V (aD, aR).
6 Appendix B
EU(abp) = 1 + i+
1
2
(1 + i)β(1− q)
EU(aD(N )) = 1 + (1 + i)β(1− q)
EU(aD(P )) = −2 + i+ 1
2
(1 + i)βq + (1 + i)β(1− q)
EU(aR(N )) = −i+ (1 + i)β(1− q)
EU(aR(P )) = −2− i+ 1
2
(1 + i)βq + (1 + i)β(1− q)
EU(aW (N )) = (1 + i)β(1− q)
EU(aW (P )) = −2 + (1 + i)β
EU(aD(N )) > EU(aD(P )) if q ∈ [0, 4β(1+i)); EU(aD(N )) > EU(aW (P ))
if q ∈ [0, 2+iβ(1+i)); EU(aD(P )) > EU(aW (P )) if q ∈ [0, 2iβ(1+i)); EU(abp) >
EU(aD(N )) if q ∈ [0, 1 − 2β(1+i)); EU(abp) > EU(aD(P )) if i < 2β − 1;
EU(abp) > EU(aW (P )) if q ∈ [0, 2(3+i)β(1+i) − 1). Recapitulating, we have
five probabilities: q1 = 4β(1+i) ; q
2 = 2+iβ(1+i) ; q
3 = 2iβ(1+i) ; q
4 = 1 − 2β(1+i) ;
q5 = 2(3+i)β(1+i) − 1).
case A: i < 2β − 1
Notice that q4 is always greater than q5, q1 and q2 are always greater than
q4; q3 is always greater than q4, q5 is always greater than q3, q5 is greater
than q1 if β < 2, q5 is always greater than q2, q1 is always greater than q2
if i < 2 and q2 is always greater than q3 if i < 2.
Thus the equilibrium strategies change depending on the parameters of the
model.
i ∈ [0, 2] and β ∈ (0, 23).
0− q1 q1 − q5 q5 − q4 q4 − q3 q3 − q2 q2 − 1
aD(N ) aD(N ) aD(N ) abp abp abp
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i ∈ [2, 2β − 1] and β ∈ (0, 23).
0− q1 q1 − q3 q3 − q4 q4 − q5 q5 − q2 q2 − 1
aD(N ) aD(P ) aW (P ) aW (P ) abp abp
i ∈ [0, 2] and β ∈ (23 , 1).
0− q1 q1 − q5 q5 − q4 q4 − q3 q3 − q2 q2 − 1
aD(N ) aD(P ) aW (P ) aW (P ) abp abp
i ∈ [0, 2] and β ∈ (23 , 1) is impossible.
case B: i > 2β − 1
i ∈ [0, 2] and β ∈ (0, 23).
0− q1 q1 − q5 q5 − q4 q4 − q3 q3 − q2 q2 − 1
aD(N ) aD(N ) aD(N ) abp abp abp
i ∈ [2, 2β − 1] and β ∈ (0, 23) is impossible.
i ∈ [0, 2] and β ∈ (23 , 1).
0− q1 q1 − q5 q5 − q4 q4 − q3 q3 − q2 q2 − 1
aD(N ) aD(N ) aD(N ) abp abp abp
i ∈ [2, 2β − 1] and β ∈ (23 , 1)
0− q1 q1 − q3 q3 − q4 q4 − q5 q5 − q2 q2 − 1
aD(N ) aD(P ) aW (P ) aW (P ) abp abp
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